The events of March 19 were no great surprise. Nor was the entire run-up to the elections. The result was exactly as predicted. And this result means defeat. Our defeat. My own personal defeat, in that I failed to disseminate the Movement’s ideas widely enough – ideas, which, if realised could have produced a very different outcome.

In a way, March 19 2006 was the dying day of an epoch whose beginning had been marked by the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the velvet revolutions of 1989. The 17 years that saw the triumphant spread of democracy across Eastern Europe, originating in the capitals of the Vyshegrad Group, should have reached their conclusion in the capitals of the Transcaucasus. Minsk should have emerged successfully through the revolution of 1996. But instead of impeachments and the establishment of democracy in Belarus, there was a coup d’etat. At the time, many regarded this as no more than a disappointing historical misunderstanding, which would soon put itself right. Few understood that it was a real failure for the programme for democratising nations with transitional economies. That moment saw the beginning of a revanchist strategy, which was tried out in Belarus, then extended to Russia and further eastwards. In 1996, the Lukashenko regime set itself no positive tasks at all, confining itself to opposing democratisation and westernisation (in Lukashenko’s famous words: “I will not have my people just trailing along behind the civilised world!”). In the ten years since then, the regime has not only grown stronger, but embraced the enthusiasm of Europe’s anti-globalists, found a common language with fundamentalist opponents of westernisation in the Muslim world, and learned how to coordinate its activities with the anti-western giants of Russia and China. Today the regime claims leadership both of the pariah nations and of the anti-western, anti-European coalition. Minsk officialdom bases its claims to leadership not only on its successful opposition to democratisation, but also on its economic ”achievements”, which purport to be a new economic model, fit to compete with the models used in every other country that has had a transitional economy, from 1989 until their admission to the European Union.

In the aftermath of the 2006 elections in Belarus, I offer a number of propositions.

1. The programme for the spread of democracy in countries with transitional economies, whether as an evolutionary process or through “velvet revolutions”, can work only where there are quasi-democratic forms of social organisation. In established authoritarian regimes, this programme will simply not work. So, if the spread of democracy eastwards from Poland is still a live issue, either the programme must be amended or a new one must be worked out. And Belarus should pioneer this.

2. Not one of the countries that have rejected westernisation, democratisation and market economics has been able to put forward any other effective economic model for development. The economic successes and achievements of Belarus are attributable not to some unique economic model, but merely to a favourable conjuncture in world and regional markets, and to general economic trends in the region. Nothing has happened in the Belarussian economy that has not been seen in neighbouring countries – except, for them, it has been slower and worse.
3. The authoritarian regime in Belarus has established itself “seriously and for the long term”. It cannot be regarded as an exception or a misunderstanding, for it is a conscious and organised response to the historic call of archaic forms of socialism (though perhaps also something more profound, if you consider that developments in Belarus and Serbia are of the same nature). The Lukashenko regime is evolving into something approaching a new form of fascism, 21st century-style, which represents a clear threat to Europe.

4. In the immediate future, Belarus itself faces two main threats: a) the “Cubanisation” of that part of society which accepts and conforms with the regime. This represents a total loss of independence and initiative – and a dependence and inability to take independent decisions. Such a society may live for generations under an authoritarian regime, and, more to the point, is unable to live otherwise. b) the “Arafatisation” of the opposition. The opposition’s loss of real support in society results in a dependency on the support of donors from without. An opposition of this kind is just as undemocratic and corrupt as the authorities. The leaders of this sort of opposition are just as immutable as the dictator, and so – just like him – they have an interest in the preservation of that dictatorship. Dictatorship of any kind makes for the moral degradation of society and of the whole population of the country.

5. What is needed is a wholesale, country-wide revival of opposition to Lukashenko’s regime, with a renewal of ideas, personnel and the electoral base. At the same time, we need to revive the external dimension of the opposition’s dealings with the international community. Officials in European and international institutions and foundations are susceptible to the same general trend. Corruption and lack of initiative are now common to both the upper echelons of the Belarussian opposition and the Western officials with whom they are in constant contact.

19 March 2006
V. Matskevich

Translated by Chris Ayton (Scotland)